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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Mark Howard Pendleton appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
jury’s verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine and his guilty 
pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm and a persistent violator enhancement.  
Pendleton asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because, he claims, the district court incorrectly concluded he did not have 
standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment 
above a commercial building where he worked.   
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Pendleton with possession of methamphetamine and 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.83-84, 213-214.1)  The state also 
alleged Pendleton is a persistent violator.  (R., p.215.)  Pendleton filed a motion 
to suppress, asserting “the officers did not have articulable facts sufficient to 
justify probable cause for a search warrant,” and that no exception to the warrant 
requirement applied.  (R., pp.39-40; see also pp.72-74, 94-96.)  At the 
suppression hearing, at which Pendleton proceeded pro se, the state indicated 
that based on assertions Pendleton made in some of his pleadings, Pendleton 
was required to demonstrate he had standing to search by providing evidence 
                                            






that he was residing at the location of the search.  (Tr.2, p.46, Ls.7-15 
(prosecutor’s comments), p.50, Ls.9-10 (Pendleton indicating he is representing 
himself).)  In an effort to establish standing, Pendleton testified that he “did not 
reside at the location,” but “was employed by the fellow that owned the building,” 
and he “expect[ed] a certain amount of privacy” to perform his job.  (Tr., p.52, 
Ls.11-12, p.53, Ls.13-25.)  Pendleton also testified that he “had tools at that 
building,” and “had certain responsibility to secure the building.”  (Tr., p.54, Ls.17-
19.)  The district court determined that, based on the evidence Pendleton 
presented, he failed to establish he had standing to challenge the search; 
accordingly, the court denied Pendleton’s motion to suppress.  (Tr., p.60, L.11 – 
p.62, L.17.) 
 Pendleton proceeded to trial at which the jury found him guilty of the 
possession of methamphetamine charge.  (R., pp.300, 303.)  Pendleton pled 
guilty to the firearm charge and the persistent violator enhancement.  (See R., 
pp.301, 327.)  The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with three years 
fixed, for the methamphetamine charge and a concurrent unified five-year 
sentence, with three years fixed, for the firearm charge.  (R., pp.327-328.)  
Pendleton filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.332-335.)    
                                            
2 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal.  All “Tr.” 
references in this brief are to the transcript that includes the February 19, 2015 
hearing on Pendleton’s motion to suppress.  The only other transcript reference 
in this brief is to the preliminary hearing held on August 13, 2014, which will be 





 Pendleton states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it determined Mr. Pendleton did not 
have standing to challenge the search of the building? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)   
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Pendleton failed to show error in the district court’s determination that 
Pendleton was not entitled to suppression since Pendleton failed to show he had 
standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment 








Pendleton Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 




 Pendleton contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress based on its conclusion that Pendleton failed to meet his burden of 
showing he had standing to challenge the search.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  
More specifically, Pendleton claims the district court determined Pendleton “could 
not have standing unless [Pendleton] claimed the building was his place of 
residence,” which Pendleton asserts is incorrect because “one may have 
standing to challenge the search of one’s workplace.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  
Pendleton further argues that he “had standing to challenge the search because 
he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  Pendleton’s 
arguments fail for several reasons.  Pendleton not only misstates the district 
court’s ruling, the record shows he failed to provide sufficient evidence at the 
suppression hearing, and the facts and the applicable law show that, even if the 
evidence presented was sufficient, Pendleton failed to show he had standing to 
challenge the search of a locked closet located in an apartment above a 
commercial building where he worked.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 




trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).    
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Pendleton Failed To Meet His 
Burden Of Showing He Had Standing To Challenge The Search Of A 
Locked Closet Located In An Apartment Above A Commercial Building 
Where He Worked 
 
A “defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his own legitimate expectation of privacy rather than 
that of a third party.”  State v. Brown, 113 Idaho 480, 484, 745 P.2d 1101, 1105 
(Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).  Thus, “[a] person challenging a search has 
the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the item or place searched.”  State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 
1234 (2008) (citations omitted); see also State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 718, 
132 P.3d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 2006) (“the burden to show a privacy interest in the 
place searched is on the defendant; the State has no responsibility to go forward 
with the evidence on this issue”).  Whether such an expectation exists requires a 
court to determine (1) whether the individual had a “subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and (2) whether “society is willing 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”  Id.  The first inquiry is a question 
of fact, and the second is a question of law.  Id.     
 A defendant may also enjoy limited Fourth Amendment protections in 
relation to his workplace.  The Supreme Court has held that the “capacity to 




invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a 
reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion.”  Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).  “It has long been settled that one has 
standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home,” and standing 
to raise a Fourth Amendment claim does not require “legal possession or 
ownership of the searched premises.”  Id. at 369 (citations omitted).  However, 
even with respect to a workplace, the defendant must show a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  Id. at 
368.  Pendleton has failed to meet his burden of showing he had standing to 
challenge the search in this case for several reasons.          
It is nearly impossible to evaluate the merits of Pendleton’s standing claim 
in light of the dearth of evidence presented at the suppression hearing.  
Pendleton filed a motion to suppress “any and all evidence, testimony and/or 
information related to the investigation of the circumstances referenced in the 
probable cause statement in this case.”  (R., p.39.)  In his motion, Pendleton did 
not identify any particular evidence, testimony, or “information” he believed 
should be suppressed.  (See generally id.)  Nor was there any evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing indicating what evidence was seized during 
the search, where it was seized from, or what “testimony” or “information” 
resulted from the allegedly unlawful search.  (See generally Tr., pp.46-62.)  
There was also no evidence presented as to the scope of the search conducted 
or the type of building where the search occurred.  (Id.)  Pendleton referred to it 




Ls.6-7, 17-18.)  The district court, on the other hand, referred to the location of 
the search as a “residence.”  (Tr., p.61, Ls.2, 13.)   
On appeal, Pendleton provides context for the search by citing testimony 
from the preliminary hearing.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-4.)  The preliminary hearing 
transcript reveals that law enforcement responded to a request from Pendleton’s 
parole officer3 to assist with a search of Pendleton’s residence, which resulted in 
the discovery of a pistol, several pellet guns, paraphernalia, and several baggies 
of methamphetamine in different places in the apartment.  (P.H. Tr., p.4, L.2 – 
p.6, L.24, p.12, Ls.14-18, p.14, L.21 – p.16, L.25.)  Detective Paul Egbert 
described the location as “an upstairs apartment” located “[a]bove a building that 
has been a commercial building off and on” and, at the time, “the downstairs part” 
was “under renovation.”  (P.H. Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.3.)  A female who 
identified herself as Pendleton’s daughter told Detective Egbert that one of the 
bedrooms in the apartment was hers.  (P.H. Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24, p.28, Ls.14-17.)  
Detective Egbert also testified that one of the bedrooms had men’s clothing in the 
dresser and hanging in the closet, and that the apartment looked “lived in” 
because, in addition to the clothing, it was furnished with couches, chairs, and a 
television, and there was “food in the kitchen.”  (P.H. Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3, p.31, 
Ls.22-24, p.38, Ls.15-24.)     
                                            
3 Although the word “probation” was frequently used during the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate presiding over that hearing clarified that Pendleton was 
on parole, not probation.  (P.H. Tr., p.42, Ls.6-8.)  This finding is consistent with 
the parole agreement the state submitted with its written response to Pendleton’s 
suppression motion in support of its claim that the search was conducted 




The preliminary hearing transcript was not, however, offered as evidence 
for the court’s consideration at the suppression hearing.  (See generally Tr.)  
Thus, it cannot be relied on for purposes of reviewing the district court’s denial of 
Pendleton’s suppression motion.  See Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, 109 
Idaho 424, 437, 708 P.2d 147, 160 (1985) (citations omitted) (“It is hornbook law 
that an appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the district 
court.”), abrogated on other grounds by Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 140 
Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 (2004); State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 233 P.3d 52 
(2010) (quotations and citation omitted) (“Findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.”).  Given 
the lack of evidence presented at the suppression hearing about the nature of the 
location searched, including where different items were discovered, Pendleton 
cannot establish he met his burden of showing he had standing to challenge the 
search of any location where evidence was actually obtained, much less that he 
would be entitled to suppression of any or all of the evidence discovered.   
Even if this Court concludes the evidence Pendleton presented at the 
suppression hearing was sufficient to consider the merits of his standing claim, or 
if the Court also considers the unadmitted testimony from the preliminary 
hearing, Pendleton has still failed to meet his burden of showing he had standing 
to challenge the search.    
 At the preliminary hearing, Pendleton objected to the characterization of 
the location of the search as his residence, and argued that he was not in 




for th[e] rifle” were found.  (P.H. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-19, p.21, Ls.3-24, p.44, Ls.12-16.)  
Similarly, at the suppression hearing, Pendleton testified that he did not reside at 
the location of the search, but “was employed by the fellow that owned the 
building,” “did work at the building,” and “had tools at that building.”  (Tr., p.52, 
Ls.11-12, p.53, Ls.24-25, p.54, Ls.6-7, 17-18.)  Based on Pendleton’s testimony, 
the district court found: 
 The Court accepted testimony from the Defendant that he 
does not reside at this residence; that he did work at this location; 
that he has some responsibilities, which – clean out the building, 
has responsibility to secure the building; that he never permanently 
resided there; that he hadn’t lived there for three months; but that at 
the time that is in question, he was sleeping at a separate 
residence, 65 North 111 East, at a cousin’s residence; and he 
definitively states that he has not resided and does not reside at 
this residence [belonging to his employer, Mr. Corona]. 
 
 And so based upon that, Mr. Pendleton, the question before 
the Court is whether or not the items that were retrieved at this 
residence should be suppressed.  
 
 The Court can’t make a finding that they should be 
suppressed without some initial standing.  And if you’re claiming 
today that this is not your place of residence, then the Court simply 
. . . cannot proceed any further.  
 
(Tr., p.61, Ls.1-18.) 
   The district court then addressed whether there was any “authority 
involving [the] workplace and whether an employee has some expectation of 
privacy at a workplace,” and stated: 
 I’m confident that there is some authority that relates to that.  
I have in my own mind my own understanding as to how far that 
authority will go, but I can say very clearly today that, based upon 
the testimony that the Court has heard today, the Court can make 
no finding that there was any expectation of privacy established by 





(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-15.)   
On appeal, Pendleton contends the district court erred by “determin[ing] 
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his 
place of residence.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (citing Tr., p.61, Ls.14-18); see also 
p.13 (same citation).)  This argument ignores the entirety of the district court’s 
comments, particularly the comments specifically acknowledging there is “some 
expectation of privacy at a workplace,” and the court’s finding that Pendleton 
failed to show any expectation of privacy on that basis.      
Pendleton next argues that he “had standing to challenge the search of 
the building because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his workplace 
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)  With 
respect to the first prong of the legal analysis – whether Pendleton had a 
subjective expectation of privacy – Pendleton correctly notes that he testified that 
he felt he had “plenty of” “standing” since he “work[ed] for a gentleman that owns 
the building,” he “did work at the building,” and “had [his] tools at the building.”  
(Tr. p.54, Ls.7-12; Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (citing Tr., p.54, Ls.6-20, p.61, Ls.1-5).) 
“But that is not enough.  The extrinsic facts must demonstrate the expectation to 
be legitimate—that is, to be objectively reasonable.”  State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 
382, 386, 707 P.2d 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1985).  Pendleton asserts he satisfies this 
requirement as well, arguing that “[m]uch like the private office discussed in 
Mancusi, [he] could reasonably have expected that he would not be disturbed in 




(Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  A review of Mancusi shows why this argument is 
frivolous.   
At issue in Mancusi was the search of “an office shared by DeForte and 
several other union officials,” which search uncovered documents used to convict 
DeForte of several criminal charges.  392 U.S. at 365.  The record in that case 
“reveal[ed] that the office where DeForte worked consisted of one large room, 
which he shared with several other union officials.”  Id. at 368.  “DeForte spent ‘a 
considerable amount of time’ in the office,” and “had custody of the papers at the 
moment of their seizure.”  Id.  The Court found that DeForte had “standing to 
object to the admission of the papers at his trial,” reasoning: 
[I]t seems clear that if DeForte had occupied a ‘private’ office in the 
union headquarters, and union records had been seized from a 
desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had standing.  
In such a ‘private’ office, DeForte would have been entitled to 
expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal or 
business invitees, and that records would not be taken except with 
his permission or that of his union superiors.  It seems to us that the 
situation was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared 
an office with other union officers.  DeForte still could reasonably 
have expected that only those persons and their personal or 
business guests would enter the office, and that records would not 
be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups.   
 
Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369. 
 Mancusi does not stand for the proposition that an employee has standing 
to challenge a search of an entire building in which he works.  Contrary to 
Pendleton’s analogy, a “private office” is not “[m]uch like” an entire building in 
which an office is located.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  While Pendleton could, 
under the rationale of Mancusi, theoretically have a legitimate privacy interest in 




expectation of privacy in the entire building just because he “did work at the 
building,” “had tools at that building,” or even because he had “responsibility to 
secure the building.”  (Tr., p.54, Ls.7, 17-19.)  Pendleton’s claim actually fails 
under Mancusi because Pendleton failed to establish, as the defendant in 
Mancusi did, that the items sought to be suppressed were located in a particular 
place inside the building over which Pendleton had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  As noted, there was no evidence at the suppression hearing on this 
point.  Reference to other portions of the record to ascertain whether such a 
connection exists demonstrates it does not.  If, as Pendleton argued at the 
preliminary hearing, “everything except for th[e] rifle” was in the locked closet that 
he did not have “control of,” then regardless of whether Pendleton worked at the 
building and stored tools elsewhere in the building, Pendleton disclaimed 
ownership of the contents of the locked closet.  Thus, Pendleton had neither a 
subjective interest in the closet or its contents, nor an interest that society would 
recognize as reasonable.  See State v. Melling, 160 Idaho 209, ___, 370 P.3d 
412, 415 (Ct. App. 2016) (“Idaho courts have held that disclaimer of ownership or 
possession constitutes abandonment,” and “[s]ociety is not willing to recognize a 
privacy interest in abandoned property.”). 
 Other portions of the record also defeat Pendleton’s workplace standing 
claim.  The testimony at the preliminary hearing was that the place where the 
search was conducted and the items were seized was an apartment where 
people were living, not a workplace.  (P.H. Tr., p.13, Ls.3-18, p.38, Ls.15-24.)     




the home.”  (P.H. Tr., p.37, Ls.17-19; see also p.13, Ls.2-3.)  Pendleton did not 
have standing to challenge the search of a locked closet located in a residence 
upstairs from where he was doing construction work just because the two were 
located in the same building.  Pendleton’s claim that the district court erred in 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Pendleton guilty of possession of methamphetamine 
and Pendleton’s guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a firearm and a persistent 
violator enhancement.   




      /s/ Lori A. Fleming     for_____________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
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